YES. This was the worst decision of the entire war for the axis. Essentially there are several key points which together make this a true game changer:
1. Operational weather for offensive operations from 25/8 to 17/10/41 would have provided 53 days of good weater which is greater than the 49 days of good (16) and marginal (33) in the OTL(Original Time Line) (which actually only started on 2/10/41) which still gets you to the 17th of Oct (Sorge's note on Japanese efforts away from the USSR was only provided on the 14/9/41).
2. The Japanese had internal provisos which were to govern their strategic direction. The first was if the Germany took Moscow they would direct there efforts towards the USSR and not the US. And if in combination they outnumbered the Soviet forces in the East by 3:1 they would direct there efforts against the Soviets.
3. Moscow was the centre of the Soviet Empire all rail networks, the entire brain of the soviet state was based there, upwards of 15-20% of Soviet GDPwas in and around Moscow.
4. The Soviets electrical supply had no integrated grid and revolved around a center near Moscow that supplied 75 percent of the power to the armament industry the elimination of this would have haemoraged Soviet industry the true achillies heel.
5. Being in Control of Moscow when the Siberians arrival would provide the axis with all the benefits of a relatively more hospitable defensive structure than the OTL. The line of axis of the arriving reinforcements assuming that surrender hadn't already been declared would have been along the Moscow Gorki rail line and easier to interdict.
Given the above it must be additionaly considered in hindsight who the person was who was whispering in Adolfs ear that influenced him to draw his crack panzer arms south to Kiev traversing 1000 + km's incurring wear and tear, not advancing on the Moscow strategic fulcrum but go after some .5 million ineret troops around Kiev. A tactical vistory but a strategic error of the most significant of magnitudes for the Axis. The additional impact of a focus on Japanese efforts towards the Soviet Union probably would have delayed US participation till well into 1942 and by then the war in the East would have been won, with 80% of the Wehrmacht now available for redeployment the Anglosphere would have been severely challenged and would have founmd an adversary significantly more powerful than what it encountered in the OTL with Soviet Russia during the Cold War.