WHY WE LOST SOUTH VIETNAM?
The Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces and the United States military in Vietnam were fighting against not only the Vietnamese Communist forces, but the whole Communist bloc as well.
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Why did we lose the second half of Vietnam to the hands of the Vietnamese Communist Party while South Vietnam and U.S. forces were armed with better weapons, more sophisticated equipment, supreme fire power?
This is one of the most controversial issues in the world that could be debated long into the future. Any study of the issue must take all the great many factors into consideration. Therefore, a short article could not cover the entire matter. And a book about it with full details could be of many hundred pages, even a thousand. Viet Quoc Home Page with many articles about the armed conflict in Vietnam is contributing only a little part of the vast domain concerning the Vietnam War.
This article is written to present a general opinion of the Vietnamese nationalist side, in order to present a number of facts especially those have not been taken into consideration by foreigner writers, to help readers with some more information. It is also for many readers who have been asking us the same question, such as high school and college students in their history classes.
1. Most anti-Communist Vietnamese believe that the United States was right when supporting the Republic of Vietnam with aids and soldiers. However, the American and the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) governments have lost the war because Washington was lacking in resolution, while South Vietnamese leaders were relying too much on American support and believed that Washington would never accept the dishonor of a total defeat.
North Vietnam Communist regime mobilized its largest resources - especially human - to sustain the war that caused it great losses. Almost a generation of North Vietnamese (born 1940 to 1955) was decimated. Many specialists, teachers and skilled workers were sent to South Vietnam as privates and have never come back.
Such mobilization was done by tightly controlling the human stomach. Hanoi established a distribution system of all basic goods (rice and rice substitutes, meat, clothing...) in scanty rations. With such system, Hanoi could compel its people to contribute their best to the war effort.
The Communist leaders in Hanoi exposed their resolution to fight to the last North Vietnamese to win the war and to maintain the ruling power of their party.
Meanwhile in South Vietnam, despite military situation was critical, the RVN government had to maintain a society as normal as possible, providing its citizens with minimum needs for a minimum standards of living.
2. The RVN and U.S. military forces committed several errors in the war.
The United States Armed Forces relied too much on their great fire power and modern weaponry and equipment. Tactics of conventional battle were mainly applied against the enemy's unconventional warfare, while American leaders seemed to be overconfident in their "know-how" in fighting a war that required the more know-how on psychological strategy than just on modern technology.
The South Vietnamese and the American military leaders tried some effective formulas with limited success. In Military Region I, the U.S. Marines and RVN Popular Force (village militia) joined together in mixed combat platoons which proved significant efficiency in counter-guerilla efforts. But it was difficult for other American infantry units to do the same because of differences in language, command and support system. Moreover, most American commanders seemed reluctant to commit their troops to militia-type activities beside poor Vietnamese. Such attachment posed trouble in control and command on the American side.
3. The air war over North Vietnam could have had desired effects if it had been executed intensively and quick. Escalation of air strikes proved a failure, especially when Hanoi regime didn't have many valuable things to lose in air strikes. It was unreasonable to put a million-dollar jet fighter and a pilot at risk of being shot down just to destroy a bridge that cost a few thousand dollars when no more objectives of higher values existed.
4. The Vietnam War has been the first armed conflict in which political and psychological warfare were the invisible fronts that the United States has ever fought.
Beside pure military failures, the RVN and the United States did achieve some victories in the other fronts. Two of the key strategies of the alliance that proved successful were the Phuong Hoang Campaign (Phoenix) and the Chieu Hoi Program.
The Phuong Hoang Campaign aimed at destroying the Communist infrastructure in South Vietnam. Communist party clandestine organizations were the backbone of the war which provided all kinds of supports including intelligence and transportation of food and ammunition supplies to its combat troops.
During the war, Western media insisted that Phuong Hoang campaign produced insignificant outcome. But recently, top North Vietnamese officials confirmed that the Phuong Hoang dealt fatal blows to the Communist infrastructure in the South.
Unfortunately, the success that nearly paralyzed the whole Communist underground network was not fully exploited.
The other was Chieu Hoi Program, which began in 1963. By April 1975, the program had attracted more than 159,000 soldiers and members of the Communist Party clandestine organizations to rally to the RVN side. Among them, about 15,000 were from North Vietnam Army regular units. Those who surrendered without willing to change side were classified as POWs, not as chieu hoi.
The ralliers received vocational training and got help in finding jobs. A large number enlisted in the RVN army and various paramilitary units. About 700 served American combat platoons as Kit Carson Scouts.
Many of the ralliers contributed their skill and their intelligence information as well as their blood to the just cause of the RVN. Thank to their contribution, the allied forces achieved numerous feats of arms, including destruction of important targets in North Vietnam.
5. On the pure military domain, "body count" has been a wrong way in conducting the war.
Besides, "body count" meant little to the North Vietnamese Communist leaders, two of whom were Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap. More than once, they confirmed that their side would decide to sacrifice unlimited human lives for final victory.
Many people were saying that MACV Headquarters lied to the press, exaggerating the enemy losses.
MACV reported that the total loss of lives on the Communist side was about more than 900.000. But a few years ago, the Communist government in Hanoi confirmed that it had lost 1,1 million soldiers. Nearly no one has given MACV retroactive credit for its discretion in reporting enemy dead.
In a related matter, the enemy strength in the MACV's estimate included only Communist troops in various combat units, while civilians serving the supply and transportation tasks - that were done in the RVN and U.S. units by the soldiers - were not counted. If non-military personnel serving Communist units were listed as military members, total strength of the Communist forces in South Vietnam could be at least twice the number 250,000 to 300,000 in the MACV estimate.
6. So far, in comments on the Vietnam War, many people have taken for granted that the only four parties in the war were the Americans, the South Vietnamese, the North Vietnamese and its disguised subordinate, the so-called National Liberation Front. That was true on the battlefields only.
In fact, the Vietnam Communist Party and its regime were strongly supported by the whole Communist bloc. Immense military aids came from Beijing and Moscow. Unofficial sources estimated that aids from Red China and the Soviet Union had been in tens of billion dollars, not far lower than US aids to South Vietnam and American military expenses in the Vietnam War.
Moreover, the Soviet Union, China, North Korea and possibly Cuba joined North Vietnamese Communist forces in direct fighting the Americans in North Vietnam with their combat pilots, and air defense SAM-6 surface-to-air battalions (Soviet). Beijing also sent some infantry divisions to safeguard the northern mountainous area of North Vietnam and many engineer regiments to repair bombed bridges and road in North Vietnam.
On the other hand, the Vietnamese Communist leaders were certain that American and South Vietnamese forces would not invade North Vietnam. So Hanoi could leave their land undefended against invasion by the Allies to send all their available ground forces to the battles in the South.
All of those proved that the Allies had underestimated the enemy capability.
7. Many South Vietnamese reason that if the U.S. forces had been employed in a cordon at the 17th Parallel from the Mekong River crossing Laotian territory, extending to the South China Sea, sealing off supply and infiltration of troops from North Vietnam and leaving the inner land battles to the South Vietnamese military, the war would have come to a different ending - at a draw if not victory.
It has been unknown whether the American government had any secret limitation in foreign relations that forbade US Army troops from operating on the territory of Laos.
8. The most powerful "weapons" of the Vietnamese Communist Party in war had been "terrorism and psychological warfare."
With terrorism in South Vietnam, the Communists needed only from 2 to 5 guerrillas to control a remote village of 1,000 people though only at night. They imposed severe and prompt punishment ranged from "three-month re-education" to "mutilation" (chopping off one finger if the convicted had intended to join the RVN army). A VC district "security chief" had the competence of giving death sentence to those considered as "incorrigible enemy's collaborators."
Terrorism also helped the Communists with huge cash support. A large number of businesses, large or small, mostly in South Vietnam remote areas that lacked of security protection, had to pay the Communist "kinh tai" (economy & finance) regularly. Failure to pay after repeated warnings or telling on them to the authorities surely brought death sentences to the victims. Many restaurants were attacked by hand grenades, hundreds of cross-country buses and local three-wheeled passengers vehicles were blown up by land mines because of similar reasons.
In several provinces, such kind of contributions that the VC "kinh tai" collected was more than taxes collected by the RVN local government.
Saigon and Washington dared not - and were unable to - possess such weapon.