Was Hitler stupid for fighting in North Africa?

Question

I mean of course in WWII. I understand why the British fought there, because they were already there and had Egypt a main British base and the Suez Canal for the British Navy and also had Malta and Gibraltar for their navy but what on earth were the Germans bothering with it for?
From reading the histories originally the German generals and Hitler only got into it in a limited way to shore up the failing Italians in Libya, but then poured in ever more troops/ tanks/ planes for 2 long years.
Even if the Germans won and took British Egypt and Suez (unlikely) so what? The British would still have Malta and Gibraltar and still naval control of the Mediterranean and British land armies in Palestine and Iraq and naval control of the Red Sea so the Germans would not even have been able to make use of Suez.
If the Germans let the British win, again so what?...The most the British could have got was Italian Libya and 'maybe' Tunisia...but the Vichy French on the German side had 300,000 troops standing firm in Algeria and these could have been added to by German troops/ armor who would just have to stand there with the Vichy French lined at the border.
So, just to try and save Italian Libya Hitler over 2 years used up 500,000 troops (250,000 and a Field Marshall in the final surrender) 3000 tanks, 2500 planes....2 whole field armies and their support.... which he then did not have to use in Russia 1941/ 1942?
We all know Hitler's blunders...was this one of his biggest...or....was there some legitimate military aim from the GERMAN view in keeping Libya and taking British Egypt I'm missing.
It seems to be just a great and unnecessary diversion of German troops from Hitler's main thrust going on against Russia at the same time?

Answer 1

Oil- which came back to haunt him when his tanks began running out of fuel

toward the end of the war. The same reason we're there today.

Answer 2

As I'm sure you know, it's easy for people like us to look back now and see where mistakes were made. The thing is that in many ways we can't now properly understand the circumstances of a decision, the pressures of the people making them, and the personalities and ideas making said decisions.



I've repeatedly mentioned on Y!A how much the war might have been different if the Germans had just pulled out of NA on the arrival of the British and Americans in Operation Torch. The quarter of a million troops and megatons of equipment and supplies might have made a major difference in the coming conflict in Europe.



At the same time, perhaps the mere possibility of breaking some of the British ability in the Med, hindering the shipping of goods and supplies while opening up the possibility of taking the war into new areas, or securing new supplies of needed war materiale (like oil), or even just keeping the loss of the Italians from exposing their southern flank even more and releasing tens of thousands of French fighters to combat them would have been worth it.



Think about these as possible reasons for continued conflict.

1. When the end really came, the loss of NA and so many Italians was a morale drain on the Axis as a whole and a major blow to the Italian government. That fact caused Italians to tire of the war and actually tried to get out of it. That caused the Germans to throw extra troops an equipment into Italy to try to prevent an easier Allied victory.

If things had gone another way the Italian government could have rallied more public support against the Allies and fought harder with the knowledge that they had instead won in NA first. That also could have prevented the Germans from commiting more troops to another fight they inevitably lost.



2. While the Vichy French government was sufficiently cowed and the forces there didn't fight the Axis during the continued control of NA, they eventually (after the British and American landings in Operation Torch) turned on their Axis masters and even bolstered the numbers of Allied troops landing in Europe during the battle for Normandy.

Having troops in NA to keep the French under control was in many ways a wise proposition. If NA had been won and secured then Torch might have failed as well, preventing those troops from joining the Allied efforts. They may not have played the biggest role in Western Europe, but they did play some.



3. The German propagana machine and military structure needed such.

The Germans worked their military magic best when advancing and their culture lived on the positive propaganda from the war. When other areas were stagnant and still, the German people and military needed something to show progress, and the fighting in North Africa could play a role in that.



I'll admit they're not all strong reasons, but they could have played a role in the decision.

Never forget how important perception can be in a situation like that.



Finally, we can't forget that the Allies also must have considerd Germany's efforts a problem, or they wouldn't have taken the time, money, and lives that they did to clear the Axis out of North Africa.

Answer 3

I think you've already pretty well nailed it. He sent the beginnings of the Afrika Korps to prop up Italian forces who were being humiliated by the much smaller British Mideast Force. Then Rommel took the offensive on his own without any strategic direction from Berlin, pulling more assets to North Africa but without final success as the British could and did always overmatch him in time. During all this, Malta was a bastion which created a terrific drain on the Luftwaffe, naval transport and supplies. Once the Germans were committed, Hitler wouldn't (psychologically, he couldn't) back down. He grudgingly sent enough to North Africa to keep things going, but never anywhere enough to score a strategic win. After the Allies landed in French North Africa, Hitler's best move would have been to pull everyone out, but instead he reinforced an untenable position and wound up losing more German troops to surrender than had surrendered at Stalingrad. So, yes, Hitler was stupid.

Answer 4

Hitler sent Rommel to North Africa to get Mussolinis chestnuts out of the fire. In the spring of 1940 the Italians started an offensive to seize the Suez Canal. They only got as far a Bardia. The British counterattacked and drove the Italians almost as far as Tripoli. Hitler then sent Rommel, one armored division, the 15th and a Light Infantry Division, the 90th. He also sent the 5th Motorized Div and bits and pieces of other units that Rommel eventually reorganized into the famed 21st Panzer Division. Over the next year and half he ran rings around the British and nearly made it to the Nile.

Answer 5

I believe he was indeed stupid to send troops to North Africa. Mussolini repeatedly demonstrated his ineptitude in combat, starting with the invasion of France in 1940. Hitler was already straining Germany's military capacity, without opening up a new front. With the British in control of Gibraltar, there was no chance to adequately support a force large enough to take Egypt. And he had other options for obtaining oil in his eastern campaigns, which made extending the war to the middle east counter-productive. I agree that he wasted his troops, but then, it was only one of dozens of mistakes Hitler made before and during the war, sabotaging Germany's small chance of winning that war.

Answer 6

I've often wondered how much of the Nazi North African campaigns weren't merely first for trying to save the Italian Forces - personally I don't see it as a need for oil during the specific historical time frame of that part of the 20th century. Oil in the modern age is always the first thought that comes to mind but Corporal Hitler already had the plan for the Caucasus for this need in his deviant master plan for later - eventually as we know he had full intention of never adhering to the Molotov-Ribbentrop/Hitler-Stalin/Moscow-Berlin pact (so many names it goes by I just added all of them here for now). Corporal Hitler's good buddy "Il Duce" is the reason he goes in - if I recall history correctly Rommel was sent in merely to shore up the Italian Forces and his position was more to take a defensive stance than offensive. This too changes as we know and would lead to an eventual loss of Italy before the Western Allies would land in Normandy in 1944.



Certainly wasn't the most strategic thing Corporal Hitler did; and, knowing what we know now it is obvious the bigger question looms as to "why"?

Answer 7

The Germans ultimate goal was to take Egypt and the Suez Canal and then continue into the Middle East and link up with German armies coming southward from the Caucasus Region of Russia. Then the Germans would of controlled the oil fields of Russia and present-day Iraq.



But the German defeat at El Alamein stopped their advance into Egypt and their defeat at Stalingrad forced them to withdraw from the Caucasus so fortunately that didn't happen.

Answer 8

Hitler sent Rommel and his Afrika Korps in Africa to prevent the defeat of the Italians in Libya put in crisis the Axis,

He sent, however, only one armored division and one light infantry division, employing a force that was 100 times less than that used on the Russian front and engaging an entire British army (the 'Montgomery's Eighth Army) ...

Answer 9

You are trying to paint a picture that is a false one. I wonder why you do that; is it out of ignorance or to mislead.

By now everyone is certain what was the bone of contention between the Axis (Hitler) & the Allies (British), with the Vichy French Forces in Algeria, left in limbo as they could have adjusted to the new regime under which they fought. It is Egypt & the adjacent 'Suez' Canal that the Frenchman, Ferdinand de Lesseps built. This 104 mile long waterway connects Mediterranean Sea to the Indian Ocean, via the Red Sea. That sums up its immense strategic worth. Through out their History Germans were never a worthy adversary, much less a match to the British - over the Oceans. They didn't even attempt it. In matters Naval, Mussolini's Italy was far better though they didn't use their power much, for whatever reason.

The British who had total naval supremacy in the Mediterranean, having secured the Western entry at Gibraltar & Eastern entry at the Suez Canal, with Malta & Cyprus as strategic posts were defending it against Field Marshal Rommel's Afrika Korps with its main thrust on Egypt. Libya, Tibia, Tunisia or Algeria or any area are mere staging posts. It amazes to me as to how strategically blind one can get !

In these columns I noticed the presence of a strong contingent who promote a view point. These are trying to find "WHY HITLER LOST" as if it is a calamity worth avoiding. These sympathisers to Hitler's cause sometimes don't hide their intentions & are blatantly moved by their own wishful thinking. These hidden (or hooded) neo-Nazis can best be ignored, but the world must also exercise abundant Caution.

Taking an overall view like me, most strategic thinkers can't miss the point that Germany is no match to the combined (massed) forces of the Allies. It is somewhat like this: their 'fuel tank' has comparatively less capacity and would come to a halt at some point, while their adversaries' was still going. So, it is sheer lack of wisdom to list out the blunders, stupidities et al, of Hitler - as if one act if done otherwise or orders issued differently would change the course of the War. Nothing can be more stupider than this. It takes the cake for "wishful thinking". It must be said that Hitler conducted the War extremely competently & well, marshalling all the resources at his command. Probably he was looking for just one blunder or mistake of the Allies to turn the tide. But the Allies gave him no such chance; meeting him in all their encounters man to man & bullet to bullet.

A significant "ignoring" the ground reality, is the ¾ ͭ ͪ of the humanity lying outside the main decision-makers. All these Imperial colonies for whatever reason, are either neutral or opposed to Hitler & put their efforts in winning the War.

Only in the East, there was a little bit of support to the Japanese, who aroused in them the Asiatic pride to use it against the European Imperialists. Westerners badly handled 'Ho chi Minh' in an all-consuming (French) greed to hold on to their colonies. Later America paid the price for it, for no apparent reason. I can emphatically say that in 1939, the European Imperialist powers didn't see what was coming on them. The calamity stood in some form by 1945, but still their greed blinded them. It was the "de-colonisation" that they weren't prepared for. Yet they gave up tamely except in some stray cases. One such was the Portuguese holding on to their Indian possessions, two of which have been usurped by the newly independent Indian government, as they didn't have access to the Sea. They waited for a decade & a half before moving militarily to take over. The Portuguese demurred but fought only to lose. As an aggrieved hey even took the case to UN for 'Justice' & even sought NATO intervention. It shows that they deemed their Estado da Indie as god-given right & 'Just'. This is the real Imperial thinking. In contrast the French, becoming wiser after the War quietly handed over their 4 sea-side enclaves (1 in the interior was already occupied) to India.

Answer 10

if nazi had control in north africa south europe would be save from invasions since it's quite hard to invade south europe without a base in north africa. eventually the allies won in north africa and attacked italy after that.

Answer 11

Hitler was stupid to ally himself with Mussolini in the first place.