How effective was WW2 unguided aerial rockets?

Question

How effective was WW2 unguided aerial rockets?

Answer 1

Not very effective as a weapon. Not reliable in targeting. Very effective in scaring the population

Answer 2

They had the R4M air to air and air to surface missiles. They were reasonably effective but in military terms they were too few and too late to make much difference to the outcome of the war.

Answer 3

those rockets were mainly used as a weapon of terror against England accuracy was not important when you are shooting at something as large as a country

Answer 4

not very

Answer 5

They were quite hit and miss as the 8 would be fired all at once so as long as they got near the target one or two would hit depending on the pilots.

The RAF Hurricanes and Spitfires would use them against tank columns, railway networks etc.

Chetak

Answer 6

The RP3 was effective against shipping, tanks and rail engines. The Hawker Typhoon was one of the most successful ground-attack aircraft of the Second World War because of them.



Or do you mean air-to-air missiles?



EDIT:

Only a fool would expect an unguided rocket to be accurate, indeed a predicted success rate of 5-10% per rocket fired might have been optimistic. Shipping and railway traffic obviously offered a more predictable bigger target.



Carl has provided some support, however it is woefully incomplete. Take his first example, how many rockets were fired? What warheads were fitted? How many vehicles had been retrieved? What were the operational orders of the sorties?



And so on – but that does not stop him offering these "stats" as useful in making a doubtful assessment.

Answer 7

Air to ground? Unlike the glowing and unsupported assessment Tim gave the RP3, the truth is that air to ground rockets were not effective. At least the Allied ones, which I have stats for, but I would imagine the same can be said of the Soviet Red Air Force and the Luftwaffe.



On 29 July, 121 Wing RAF made 99 sorties against a German column using rocket firing typhoons with an unknown number of sorties from 83 Group USAAF utilizing 500 lb bombs. A total of 40 vehicles were found in the target area. 7 of which had been abandoned and 33 had been destroyed. Of those 33 only 7 could be positively identified as being destroyed by rockets and further 2 were possible. Of those nine targets, two were tanks. The report concludes that the attack was a success, that it had a major demoralization effect on the enemy, but despite the destruction no graves or bodies were discovered in the area.



In the Mortain area in August 1944, over a six day period, the pilots from the RAF and USAAF claimed to have destroyed 252 tanks (the RAF claimed 140), and 228 motorized transport (MT)(the RAF claiming 112). The investigation that followed found 128 tanks and MT in the area, of which 17 had been destroyed by RP3 rockets. Of those 17 confirmed destroyed vehicles, five were Panthers and 2 were Mark IV tanks. The report again concludes that the air force played a decisive role, but notes that the claimed to actual destroyed was around four times too high.



Further examples are provided. In the "pocket area", from D-Day to the closing of the Falaise Pocket, an estimated 1,270 vehicles were destroyed of which only 1.2 per cent (16, four of which were tanks) could be positively identified as being destroyed by rockets. During the actual battle for the pocket, the tally raises to 1.7 per cent. In another study in parts of the same area, of 82 tanks looked at only 2 could be confirmed as being destroyed by rockets.



During the Ardennes offensive, of 101 German tanks and SP guns examined only seven were destroyed from the air. That includes one tank in the confirmed bomb category, and six in the "possible air attack" category.



In a conclusion to another report, it is noted "the greatest effect of attacks by rocket firing Typhoons in close support is morale".



It is a myth that CAS armed with rockets blew up tanks left, right, and center. The operational research carried out proves that in regards to actually destroying tanks, the air force was ineffective. In destroying soft skinned vehicles they were effective. In damaging morale, they were highly effective. So how effective was unguided rockets, in regards to the three categories mentioned in the previous sentence: not effective, effective, extremely effective.